



# **Ransomware Response and Recovery Efforts**

#### **Essential Cybersecurity law**

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
# **Ransomware** Multifaceted Extortion

- Deployment of ransomware encryptors
- Theft of sensitive data
- Publication of stolen data on a "name-and" shame" website
- Additional coercive tactics
- Disruption and brand damage

Source: Mandiant M-Trends 2021

77%

of ransomware incidents now include data exfiltration



Source: Coveware Ransomware Attack Vectors Shift as New Software Vulnerability Exploits Abound April 21, 2021





This presentation will provide an abbreviated example of ransomware attack with a hypothetical company (ACME) to highlight the unique challenges and legal nuances organizations face when responding to these attacks.

ACME in a multi-national, publicly traded company, based in Texas. ACME has operations in the UK, EU, and Brazil. The company employees 20,000 individuals, has a self-insured health plan, and directs sales to both businesses and individuals. ACME is also contractor with the US Department of Defense.

Throughout the exercise, Will Daugherty, Tim Newman and Shawn Tuma will serve as counsel for ACME and respond to factual scenarios presented.

Participants can use the Chat function to pose questions for the panel.

**NRF** 

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## **Initial Awareness**

### July 26, 2021, 6:30 a.m.

- On Monday morning, an ACME plant manager in the US reports that she is unable to access email, file-share, and other applications. While looking into the issue, the IT help desk receives several calls from other employees in Texas and EU with similar issues.
- IT discovers that files on numerous files shares are encrypted and sees active encryption taken place on other servers. They locate a ransom note and immediately escalate to the CISO.
- Initial analysis by the CISO and InfoSec team shows that domain controllers, file share servers, Exchange servers, and virtual server environment are actively being encrypted. The team is unable to gain access to the back-up environment to determine impact.

**NRF** 

## **Ransom Note**

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# **Incident Response Team Activation and Initial Steps**

#### **Containment**

- Secure the network
- Preserve evidence for investigation
- How to minimize business impact from security measures

#### Restoration

- Identify available backups; prioritize systems to restore
- What options if backups destroyed?
- What costs to business if data must be recreated?

### **Business Continuity**

- Identify critical systems impacted by the incident.
- What procedures can be implemented to minimize business operations?







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